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The French Intelligence Act: Resonances 
with the USA PATRIOT Act  
Pierre-Antoine Chardel, Robert Harvey, and Hélène Volat. Translated by Ashar Foley 
Highlights 
• The French Intelligence Act in July 2015 was passed in response to the January Charlie 
Hebdo attacks without a significant public debate before being ruled to be within the 
principles of the French Republic 
• In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed with similar language focusing on the need 
for security and surveillance in exceptional circumstances 
• Both French and American governments focused on the need for surveillance as a 
patriot matter to prevent future attacks from outsiders of society 
• Unlike the direct surveillance model by the NSA revealed by Snowden’s leaks, the 
French Intelligence Act requires internet service providers and telephone operators to 
be able to detect “terrorist threats” in their data when requested by the government 
• Given the prevalence of tracking by consumer technologies today, are individuals 
implicitly submitting to greater surveillance? 
 
Comparing the lead-up to the passage of the French Intelligence Act to the US PATRIOT Act. 
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Editor’s Note 
Given the recent terrorism attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, and the subsequent 
actions by the French government to increase security and its surveillance powers, 
Technology Science is publishing this political philosophy analysis paper to give context to 
recent events. The French Intelligence Act was passed in July 2015 as a response to the 
January attacks on the magazine Charlie Hebdo. This paper focuses on the French 
Intelligence Act, especially in comparison the US PATRIOT Act of 2001 passed in response to 
terrorist attacks in the United States. What are the similarities and differences? The recent 
public attention due to the unsettling Paris attacks presents a unique opportunity to focus on 
historical examples of surveillance laws passed in response to terrorism attacks.  
Abstract 
This paper is a study in political philosophy. In the wake of the January 2015 terrorist attacks 
in Paris, the French parliament adopted an Intelligence Act. Some considered the Act, passed 
in May and June of the same year, balanced, justified, and necessary. Others rejected it as an 
ill-conceived erosion of freedom. Does this Act blatantly undermine the democratic balance 
between the need for security and the demand for civil rights and liberties? The public might 
have expected the French Intelligence Act of 2015 to give rise to a serious, frank, and open 
debate about the means for combating terrorism without imposing measures that appear 
detrimental to citizen privacy. Instead, on July 23, just months after the terrorist attacks, the 
Constitutional Council, which François Hollande, the President of the Republic, had asked to 
convene about the constitutionality of this law, delivered its verdict: the Intelligence Act in no 
way violates the principles of the Republic [1]. Some compare the situation in France to that 
in the United States in 2001, when a set of emergency laws under the acronym USA PATRIOT 
Act were hastily promulgated several weeks after the criminal attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Is the Intelligence Act in France essentially a French Patriot Act?  
Analysis summary: We perform a political philosophy comparison of the French Intelligence 
Act of 2015 to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 using political and historical contexts. We find 
that although some differences are in evidence, such as relative engagement in debates 
surrounding the legislation, and relative challenges based on the constitutionality of 
legislation, there are profound similarities, such as legislation occurring hastily and in the 
immediate wake of particularly spectacular terrorist attacks, social acceptance of sweeping 
surveillance measures, and, social acceptance of loss of privacy in the age of personal 
electronic connectivity.  
Introduction 
On September 11, 2001, two airliners hijacked by al-Qaeda agents crashed into both towers 
of the World Trade Center in New York City, eventually destroying both buildings and killing 
people inside and many of those who had responded. On the same day, another plane 
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rammed into the Pentagon, and a fourth crashed into a pasture in Pennsylvania, the 
terrorists’ plan seemingly thwarted by passengers. In all, 2,996 people died, including the 19 
hijackers. In response, a 342-page body of laws known as the USA PATRIOT Act was passed in 
late October 2001. It was signed by President George W. Bush on October 26.  
On January 7, 2015, two brothers claiming association with al-Qaeda burst into the Paris 
office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, killing 11 people with their assault rifles. As 
they escaped, they executed a police officer. An associate of the two killed another police 
officer the next day. Then, on January 9, the same individual took shoppers at a kosher 
supermarket hostage, killing four before being killed himself. In response, an Intelligence Act 
lending sweeping authority to the Prime Minister was passed in June 2015 and declared 
constitutional in July, a few months after the original attack. 
Background 
Heinous acts or anxious anticipation of heinous acts against the U.S. population and its 
interests have historically led to either hasty or seemingly over-reactive legislation and 
practice. Here are some examples.  
During World War I, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sedition Act of 1918. The Act targeted 
individuals who publicly criticized the government. It made it a crime to “willfully utter, print, 
write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of the 
Government of the United States” or to “willfully urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of 
the production" of the things “necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war.” The Act 
was repealed in 1921, two years after World War I ended. 
After Hitler and the Nazis had invaded most of Europe, the U.S. Congress enacted the Alien 
Registration Act (or Smith Act) of 1940 to keep aliens under close surveillance. The Act made 
it a criminal offense to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government. The law also required 
all alien residents to file a statement about their personal and occupational status and their 
political beliefs. The Act remains on the books. The Sedition Act of 1918 and the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940 seriously curtailed First Amendment rights in the United States. 
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese made a surprise military strike on the United States naval 
base at Pearl Harbor. A couple of months later, in February 1942, President Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 9066, which called for the forced incarceration of some 120,000 people of 
Japanese ancestry living in the United States. Most of the incarcerated (62 percent) were U.S. 
citizens. 
The House Un-American Activities Committee was a U.S. congressional committee created in 
1938 (and ultimately dissolved in 1975) to ferret out U.S. citizens with Nazi ties. Its role 
broadened to investigate disloyalty and subversive activities by individuals or businesses it 
suspected of Communism. Even though he was not a member of the committee, Senator 
Joseph McCarthy is well known for making sweeping claims that large number of 
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Communists and Soviet spies were in the United States, thereby motivating ongoing 
committee investigations.  
The perpetration or the anticipated perpetration of heinous acts in France or against French 
interests has also led to legislation restricting civil rights. Here are some examples. 
During the Third Republic (1870–1940), anarchists made several bombings and assassination 
attempts. These motivated the “villainous laws” (lois scélérates) of 1893–94. These laws 
restricted the freedom of the press and effectively silenced all anarchist groups, including 
pacifists and antimilitarists.  
After World War II, in 1945 emergency measures were taken that nationalized key sectors of 
the economy, such as energy, air transport, banking, and insurance, and established a Social 
Security and welfare system. The party structure emerged and later that year elections were 
held. France adopted a new constitution and a parliamentary form of government. This was 
the launch of the Fourth Republic (1946–1958). 
Together, the Fourth Republic and the Fifth Republic (1958–present) evolved France’s three-
tier notion of “states of emergency.” An actual state of emergency is a version of the state of 
exception (see note 19) that is slightly less restrictive than the state of siege, in which all 
powers are transferred to the military.  
States of emergency were regularly imposed in France during the Algerian War, notably from 
1961 to 1963, during which a massacre of Algerians in Paris by the police took place on the 
night of October 17, 1961. The concept of a state of emergency was revived in 2005 to impose 
curfews during riots in poor housing estates in the suburbs. Curfews and emergency powers 
were imposed again the day after the November 2015 attacks at Le Bataclan concert hall and 
other Paris locations (see note 2). 
In the face of modern terrorism, both the United States and France have recently enacted 
mass surveillance laws. These laws survey the entire population or a substantial fraction of 
populations in order to find suspicious activity or to monitor a small group. By its nature, 
mass surveillance tends to violate notions of privacy, civil and political rights, and freedoms. 
Today’s digital society makes mass surveillance possible in ways previously unimagined, 
including unprecedented surveillance of communication and online use. How do the political 
and historical contexts of these countries influence their mass surveillance laws?  
Methods 
A political philosophy analysis often compares two cases in order to discover philosophical 
elements surrounding events of historical and political importance. In comparing recent 
mass surveillance laws in the United States and France, we believe the critical dimensions of 
comparison are: (A) the discursive contexts of mass surveillance, (B) the introduction of laws 
of exception into the domain of national security, and (C) the aesthetic of generalized 
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surveillance. In each dimension of comparison, we use authoritative sources to discover what 
may be generalizable, to identify philosophical mechanisms at play, to identify salient 
differences, and to discover what appears to be superficially similar. Specifically, we compare 
American and French dispositions in answers to the following questions. 
A. Discursive Contexts of Mass Surveillance 
1. How does the government characterize its mass surveillance law in light of civil 
liberties? 
2. What is the public response to and knowledge of the mass surveillance law? 
3. What is the discourse around patriotism and mass surveillance? 
4. Who are identified as the targets of the mass surveillance? 
B. Security and Exceptionality 
1. Is security an exception to civil liberties? 
2. What roles do patriotism and timing play? 
3. Can uses creep beyond terrorism? 
4. How are specific acts characterized as generalized notions of war? 
C. An Aesthetic Aligned with Generalized Surveillance 
1. Where might patriotic dogmatism lead? 
2. What are the historical parallels?  
3. What role does personal technology play? 
D. Technological Surveillance Activities 
1. What are the technologies deployed? 
2. What is the role of the individual in contributing to mass surveillance? 
Analysis 
Below is a political philosophy analysis of the Intelligence Act and the USA Patriot Act based 
on the criteria described in the Methods section above. 
A. Discursive Contexts of Mass Surveillance 
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From the American side, in late 2006, John Yoo, legal expert and counselor to the George W. 
Bush administration, affirmed: “[T]he government may be justified in taking measures which 
in less troubled conditions could be seen as infringements of individual liberties [2].” To claim 
that this position, stated as a defense years after the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
characterizes the politics of American security would be misleading, as some have voiced 
privacy concerns [3].  
However, the American public was generally comfortable with it. According to a 2004 
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll taken about two years after the enactment of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, about one-quarter of Americans (26%) believed the Act went too far in restricting 
people's civil liberties in order to fight terrorism. About the same number (21%) thought it did 
not go far enough, while the largest number (43%) believed it was about right. However, few 
Americans said they were highly familiar with the details of the Act [4]. 
On the French side, in the days following the Senate’s largely favorable vote in favor of the 
French Intelligence Act, Prime Minister Manuel Valls boasted of “exceptional means and 
measures in order to meet the serious security challenges of our time,” but added that France 
would take this course without actually putting “exceptional measures” in place. He 
continued, as if to support and legitimate this obvious tone of denial with regard to the taboo 
of “laws of exception”: “Recourse to the most aggressive techniques, such as the intrusion 
into digital and domestic information, will be exceptional [5].” The next day, Minister of 
Defense Bernard Cazeneuve went further, saying aloud what Valls did not: “These are 
measures that could put private life and the right to privacy into question [6].” 
As problematic from an ethico-political point of view as these declarations are, what was 
popular opinion among French citizens? A poll in April 2015 run by CSA for the French news 
website Atlantico indicates that while 63% were favorable (of which 23% were “very 
favorable”), a full 72% had either never heard of the Act or didn’t understand it. The vast 
majority of French citizens appeared more or less ignorant of the security measures proposed, 
as well as to the possible threat of having a police state [7].  
The citizenry in both countries seem relatively unconcerned by the questions of 
informational ecology that are nevertheless acutely pertinent in highly technologized society. 
Indeed, American and French citizens may move about in a world where, the more 
technological or scientific the achieved innovation, the less they are encouraged to question 
it.  
The opaqueness of technology is not the only issue. The general acceptance of the spread of 
surveillance technologies is not unrelated to the propensity of public opinion to go along 
rather passively with major decisions instituted by the State [8], particularly when the public 
sees itself as dispossessed in the grand scheme of dominant economic and financial 
paradigms. We find ourselves indirectly recalling the situation described in 1835 by Alexis de 
Tocqueville, a French political thinker and historian, when he attempted to imagine under 
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what traits despotism would be able to occur in the contemporary world. Tocqueville 
imagined “an innumerable crowd of like and equal men” turning endlessly upon themselves 
while producing petty and vulgar pleasures:  
“Above these an immense tutelary power is elevated, which alone takes charge of assuring 
their enjoyments and watching over their fate. It is absolute, detailed, regular, far-seeing, and 
mild […]; it provides for their security, foresees and secures their needs, facilitates their 
pleasures, conducts their principal affairs, directs their industry, regulates their estates, 
divides their inheritances […]. So it is that every day it renders the employment of free will 
less useful and more rare [9].” 
In an astonishing buck-passing of progressive unaccountability, public opinion today 
demands security and normalization, no doubt for want of state intervention in neoliberal 
deregulation, which often has violent consequences in terms of social insecurity [8]. This 
partly explains why, despite the revelations of secretive activity under the USA PATRIOT Act 
by the National Security Agency (NSA) [10], measures favoring public debate about the 
respect of privacy and of personal data remain extremely weak. Any anticipated reckoning by 
the public is far from certain, and if realized, may be short-lived.  
Under such circumstances, the mainstay of normality is often invoked, particularly by the 
youngest members of society. And when normality rules the day, an exceedingly naïve 
question arises: If you have nothing to hide, why should you fear surveillance? Edward 
Snowden restates this commonplace sentiment, incisively revealing the problems within it: 
“Arguing that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no 
different than saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say [11].” 
Most important, grounds for suspicion always and in all circumstances can be found where 
there is the will to do so. As Jean-Marc Manach writes, “It is not because you have nothing to 
hide that you will never be reproached. When one seeks, one finds, always [12].” 
Sociologically, one can remark on the fact that, despite various protest movements, both in 
the streets and on the Web, and even very sharp expressions of concern (notably from the 
Council of Europe, the Quadrature du Net, the Human Rights League, Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, the Syndicat de la Magistrature, and Reporters without Borders), the 
attitude of the majority in France with regard to the Intelligence Act demonstrates a docile 
acceptance that is more or less conscious of the fact that measures are likely to violate 
certain fundamental principles of the Republic. In these respects, the reception of the 
Intelligence Act in France resembles the reception of the USA PATRIOT Act, even though the 
attacks are not altogether comparable. Following the spectacular crimes perpetrated by 
Osama bin Laden’s henchmen, the Bush administration appeared to rouse and maintain 
concerns of terror in the minds of the populace, without limit and for as long as possible. This 
was not exactly the case in France. 
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Indeed, the contexts for the attacks of January 2015 in Paris and of 2001 in New York are not 
easy to compare, primarily from a socio-historical point of view. As many specialists of the 
Arab world emphasize, ISIS and its strategies—though they have as their origin the same 
radical “Islamist other”—are profoundly different from al-Qaeda. Gilles Kepel is particularly 
eloquent on the subject [14]. Furthermore, American patriotism has no equivalent in France’s 
political arena. The French political class, for several years now, has shown a propensity to 
favor the adoption of greater surveillance and security measures in response to legitimate 
societal anxieties, not only in regard to terrorism, but increasingly also with respect to 
unemployment and social insecurity. This phenomenon had already been quite in evidence 
in some of the speeches made by candidates between the two rounds of the 2012 
presidential election.  
Today, however, the terrain is even less stable for a socialist government increasingly 
tempted to play the game of the parties on the extreme right by promoting a politics of 
security. This game is not only dangerous from a democratic point of view but also quite 
inappropriate, for if the aim of the Intelligence Act is to block terrorism coming from outside 
of Europe, what need is there to access and decrypt every single voice and written 
communication made in the entire country? For contrast, the Charlie Hebdo attackers were 
French citizens. At a time when the revelations made by Edward Snowden have led to the 
repeal of the related articles of the PATRIOT Act, is it not questionable for France to enact 
what may be a similar law? 
If surveillance of the entire population is what the Intelligence Act makes lawful, its current 
application targets certain specific segments of the population according to a postcolonial 
discourse applied to contemporary European demographics. In his portentous essay of 2007, 
Mathieu Rigouste highlighted “the discursive orientations inherited from the colonial wars 
which have been recovered to serve the technological repertory of security intelligence [15].” 
This sociologist rigorously and systematically demonstrates the genealogy of the enemy from 
within. “The notion of the gray area,” he writes, “is decisive here. It opens the door for 
including inner territories—i.e., working-class districts—among breeding grounds for the 
postcolonial threat in a broader theory of transnational territories as lawless zones [15].” 
Focused on an enemy defined in American discourse as fundamentally “Islamic” (and thus 
hopelessly inassimilable and “other,” permanently from elsewhere) the U.S. government’s 
security approach may systematically fail to prevent any terrorist act committed by an 
American of European ancestry. Potential blindness of the American disposition when it 
comes to an enemy “among us” may seem absolute: the April 1995 attacks in Oklahoma City, 
perpetrated by two extreme-right Anglo-Saxon libertarians, offer reasonable though 
imperfect evidence. Another example is the crime perpetrated in Charleston against 
members of an African-American church by the young white American Dylann Roof in 2015. 
In the case of France, since Algerian independence in 1961, the enemy proliferates in certain 
zones of the Metropolis, where his right to exist in peace is endlessly questioned. Can French 
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security imagine a terrorist profile other than something akin to a Merah or a Coulibaly? 
Mohammed Merah, a Franco-Algerian Salafist terrorist, killed seven individuals-—principally 
Jews and French military personnel—in March 2012 in and near Toulouse. Amedy Coulibaly, a 
French terrorist of Malian ancestry, partnered with the Kouachi brothers, who committed the 
attack on Charlie Hebdo headquarters, killing a policewoman the day after the newspaper 
was hit and four people in a kosher supermarket the following day. Can the potential terrorist 
be someone besides an outsider or a recently immigrated individual? 
The discourse in both the United States and France has yet to grapple with their own citizens 
performing acts of terrorism.  
B. Security and Exceptionality 
The conclusion of the 2006 essay De l’exception à la règle: USA PATRIOT Act [13] analyzes the 
consequences of measures the United States passed into law in the wake of September 11, 
2001. In that work’s final chapter, the authors raised the question of the influence of those 
measures on other countries and of the danger that they might become a model or paradigm. 
Consequently, there is something profoundly ironic in the fact that at the very moment when 
the French National Assembly passed the Intelligence Act, the Second U.S. Court of Appeals in 
May 2015 released a 97-page ruling denouncing the illegality of the massive collection of 
telephone data by the NSA since the PATRIOT Act took effect. This document deemed the 
extent of surveillance since 9/11 to be “stupefying” and the NSA guilty of having overstepped 
statutory boundaries through a perceived misuse of section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.  
Yet as divergent as the American and French socio-historical contexts are, one observes that 
discursive contexts regarding terrorism and socio-technological interactions produce certain 
resonances. Despite certain positions taken and certain declarations made, a state of 
exception clearly emerges in both cases [16]. 
The first paragraph of the French bill’s “rationale,” as it was presented on March 19, 2015 
before the French National Assembly, is revealing in this regard:  
“Information is gathered and used to learn about risks and prevent threats to our country 
and its people, and thus to better understand the great challenges we face. The bill thus 
contributes to ensuring civil rights whose preservation depends, in turn, on public order. In 
the current national and international contexts, strengthening intelligence policy in the full 
respect of individual liberties is required [17].” 
Although the bill’s first article specifies the aim of the law—namely the prevention of future 
attacks—nowhere in the bill are the threats specified to any degree. Likewise, while that first 
article makes a reassuring gesture in favor of the “respect of individual liberties,” it leaves 
unresolved the specificity and complexity of the technological means that the law is destined 
to deploy.  
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Consider the technological means that the NSA deployed in secret for a number of years. 
Legalizing hidden procedures that have the possibility of capturing all personal data of 
citizens could establish a regime of widespread suspicion acceptable to the citizenry. Trust 
between individual citizens—an essential dimension of all coexistence—could become 
nullified [18]. Moreover, a potential reign of suspicion may no longer be aimed strictly at the 
struggle against terrorism. The spirit of these kinds of laws is to prevent all “attacks against 
the republican form of its institutions” including “collective violence likely to endanger 
national security [17].” What constitutes danger may obviously be stretched to a point of 
nebulousness if possible terrorist actions become confused with acts of legitimate dissent 
within a democratic society. 
Notwithstanding the rationale of being responsive to an attack, the urgency with which the 
French Intelligence Act was adopted is highly problematic. Given the usual skepticism of 
French public opinion, it is surprising that the legislators’ “accelerated procedure” did not 
cause more of an uproar. The haste with which the French government passed the 
Intelligence Act draws a similar context in which the USA PATRIOT Act was adopted. 
Unpacking the acronym for the USA PATRIOT Act reveals how patriotism intertwines with 
militarism in the short time table: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism [13]. 
It took fourteen years before a U.S. senator besides Russ Feingold, the sole upper house 
member who opposed the USA PATRIOT Act at the time, could be quoted as harshly 
criticizing it.  
“We all now know that the NSA has for years been using Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to 
sweep up phone records of innocent Americans, without any connection to terrorism. We 
also know that the NSA used a similar legal theory for years to collect massive amounts of 
metadata related to billions of emails sent to and from innocent Americans. We must no 
longer allow that sort of bulk collection on innocent Americans. The American people oppose 
this indiscriminate dragnet collection of their records, the courts have found it to be unlawful, 
and the House of Representatives has voted overwhelmingly to end this program through the 
USA FREEDOM Act. Now is the time for the Senate to act [19].” 
It was fourteen years before Americans would begin to witness the intensity of discussion 
that would normally have taken place prior to the hasty passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
adopted mere weeks after the attacks by a vast majority of legislators who had not even read 
it. We would be neglectful, however, not to recall briefly that since 2001 Section 215 of the 
PATRIOT Act had been the source of vehement protest in the United States by the American 
Library Association (ALA) and by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other 
associations that defend personal freedom, and that all of these protests opposed what 
constituted for them a fundamental violation of the private life of citizens without, for all that, 
constituting an effective defense against “terrorism.”  
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Were it not for Edward Snowden’s reports in June 2013 that the public has been subjected to 
massive and wide-ranging surveillance, would the silence have continued? On May 31, 2015, 
the U.S. Congress allowed section 215 of the Act to expire, making way for a plan to reform 
the NSA (the Freedom Act to which Leahy referred in his statement cited above) passed 
astoundingly by a wide coalition of Democrats and Republicans. However, the USA PATRIOT 
Act has never been abrogated, and the most questionable aspects of it, like Section 215, 
survive in new guises, as the USA FREEDOM Act of June 2015 clearly shows. But for the time 
being, the Freedom Act compels the NSA to obtain a search warrant before it can order 
telecommunications operators to hand over conversations between citizens, or between 
citizens and their foreign correspondents. 
Many U.S. experts have gone on record to state that the measures France already had in 
place before January 2015 were ample and perfectly adapted to the anti-terrorist struggle. As 
David Raskin, former chief anti-terrorist prosecutor for the Manhattan federal court, affirmed 
right after the January 2015 attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the kosher supermarket: “The 
French were good, and their laws were tough […]. I was always jealous of some of their trial 
procedures, because they were more favorable to the prosecutors than those in effect in the 
U.S.A [20].” That was before the French Intelligence Act. Today, after the passage of the Act, 
on a decision of the Prime Minister alone, state services free of legal oversight can access 
digital data by the installation of “black boxes” within telecom operations that enable the 
analysis of all Internet exchange. With this increased surveillance capacity, executive power 
in France seems fully sovereign. As Article L. 821-1 of the law explains, “implementation 
within national jurisdiction of information collection technologies mentioned in title V of the 
present text is authorized by the Prime Minister [17].” Because the Constitutional Council 
balked at censuring this law for its unconstitutionality [21], judicial authority is now reduced 
to a simple advisory function—something that those most attuned to these questions have 
been long predicting. The former President of the French Association of Investigating and 
Examining Magistrates and Prosecutor for the Antiterrorism Division, Marc Trévidic, is clear 
about the risks to which society is exposed under such a law: 
“... if an intelligence law is not well-conceived and rational, it could easily become a 
formidable weapon of repression. An intelligence law should not only protect citizens against 
terrorism, but also against the State. We in France are doing neither. There is a total absence 
of control in this law. We are doing far less than what we should be doing.” 
According to Trévidic, in order to specify risks and do away with the “I have nothing to hide” 
attitude, he continues: 
“In its efforts to gather political intelligence, the State may easily be tempted to spy on all of 
its perceived enemies, social movements, as well as protests. There is criminal intelligence 
and there is political intelligence. In this law, however, the criteria are rather vague. Frankly, 
the Prime Minister’s room for maneuver is immense and the nation has no way of knowing 
whether something illegal will be done [22].”  
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In advocating for the USA PATRIOT Act, the Bush administration—politically determined to 
pass emergency measures—transfixed the population with euphemisms borrowed from 
military strategists, with rhetoric of morality, patriotism, and the hyper-technical—in short, 
with a vocabulary aimed at drumming up support among the masses that aligned the politics 
of the phantasm of an Empire of the Virtuous against the “Empire of Evil.” In this discursive 
configuration, a mass crime (the 9/11 attacks) becomes an “act of war.” The pursuit of a 
handful of terrorists transmogrifies into “generalized warfare.” The rather conventional and 
generally accepted notion that the nation is authorized to take up armed struggle in the 
event of actual invasion becomes the belief in the effectiveness of “preemptive war” against a 
diffuse enemy constituted not of soldiers but innumerable “foreign enemy combatants” 
everywhere present and nowhere visible [23].  
In summary, it is striking to see this vocabulary for a world of generalized surveillance and 
perpetual war. Bush repeated endlessly, starting in September 2001, that “we are a country 
at war with terrorism.” Manuel Valls repeats today that “France is at war with terrorism, 
djihadism, and radical Islam.” 
C. An Aesthetic Aligned with Generalized Surveillance 
Imagine the society that takes shape in the aftermath of hastily adopted mass surveillance 
laws. Patriotism, having been the principal impetus for the surveillance tidal wave in the 
United States since the beginning of the twenty-first century, leaves in its wake a massive 
corpus of emergency measures and rhetoric that have become characteristic of the era of the 
USA PATRIOT Act and of the second Iraq War. Euphemisms such as “weapons of mass 
destruction,” “collateral damage,” and “coercive interrogation” have proliferated, prospered, 
and lost their strangeness or unacceptability. Is this symptomatic of a society that wants to 
be under a “full spectrum domination” of which “preemptive war” and “extraordinary 
rendition” are the only two consequences? If so, does this predict democratic decline? 
As comforting as some of the rhetoric around mass surveillance may seem—“homeland 
security” being the prime example—it signals some of contemporary history’s worst periods. 
The use of such a term is curious if one considers that its most infamous deployments were in 
Nazi Germany and in South Africa under apartheid. The definition of homeland is merely a 
place to which a group of people holds a long history and cultural association. Homelands of 
yesteryear could be, as Harvey and Volat wrote in 2006,  
“...territories—rather homologous to Indian reservations in the United States—where the 
Whites granted nominal autonomy to indigenous peoples. As for Hitler’s Germany, Nazis used 
the word as a patriotic pledge to their notion of Germany, and as such the term became 
politically synomous in the Europe of the 1930s with the ideology crouching beneath the 
German cognate of Homeland: Heimatland [24].” 
When the exception becomes the rule, semantic perversions can run rampant, not only 
numbing people, lulling them to civil sleep, but also progressively imposing upon them a 
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certain aesthetic regime (since it is our aesthesis, which is to say our sensibility, which plainly 
sees itself affected and mobilized by such perversions). Such a regime may then become the 
only source of what is possible aesthetically. 
Today, political power in France also integrates this type of discursive strategy. When Manuel 
Valls strives to assure the public that the French Intelligence Act eliminates any “gray zone” in 
its surveillance measures, he says: the government will henceforth do openly, at will, and 
without serious judicial limitation, what the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) 
has already been doing unofficially for decades. Under cover of codifying methods already 
employed by intelligence services, the Intelligence Law seems to whitewash certain practices 
of the DGSI that may have been illegal.  
Further, when the French executive authority alone possesses and controls this supreme 
power of surveillance over the people, this concerns not only the current government but 
also all those who might come to power in the future. The almost total absence of resistance 
to such attacks on individual freedom suggests that the French citizen may have become as 
normalized to mass surveillance as his fellow American.  
In France, security had long been in decline as a topic in political discourse [25], so are 
current French security and surveillance policies merely the carbon copy of those extolled in 
the United States? Probably no more than ISIS is the exact copy of al-Qaeda, for as in the case 
of this pair, the one exists in response to, and in struggle against, the other. In this area, 
French policies have been conceived with lucid knowledge of American security legislation. 
Furthermore, they reflect the available and expansive technological means of 2015 and no 
longer those of 2001. One notable difference with 2001 is that our digital environments instill 
and install in us inexorably, every day that passes, the phenomenon of traceability. The order 
of the hypermodern era is, as psychoanalyst Gérard Wajcman writes, to render possible the 
permanent capture of all of our activities: 
“Formerly, power entailed being master of the gaze. But the gaze’s power obtained only 
insofar as it was hidden. “To see without being seen” was an attribute of the power of God or 
of the guard of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. Today, the master’s gaze is no longer hidden 
but unveiled. Its eye is everywhere, and everywhere visible. It is in this that I maintain that 
hypermodernity is the establishment of a civilization of the gaze [26].” 
The intensity of permanent identification becomes a factor in social recognition. As people 
are identified, they occasionally feel themselves recognized as a consequence. Does the 
dependence of the contemporary subject on its technological supplement thus amount to a 
return to the “grand narratives” deconstructed by Lyotard in the early 1980s [27]? If so, the 
illusion that people are emancipated or almost so will be impervious to critique.  
The unquestioned motif of progress—and the “grand narrative” that sustains it—intervenes 
similarly in the adoption of the Intelligence Act. The intention of the French power structure is 
to avoid the failures of and, above all, the objections against the USA PATRIOT Act while at 
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the same time improving it. The old saw of French exceptionalism is alive and well in the 
claims made by certain politicians about the virtues of a distinctly French finesse even in the 
era of generalized surveillance.  
Additionally, social and political acceptance everywhere in the world of personal 
technologies has evolved vastly since 2001. Citizens now massively depend on gadgets that 
are as close to being bodily prostheses as imaginable. These markers of “improvement” or 
added comfort are now necessities of existence [28]. The socio-technological change 
between 2001 and 2015 should thus allow an account of the evolution of the relationship 
between the vastness of information in our world and the operation that we call 
“intelligence”—in all senses of the word—that still reigns over it. In freely surrendering 
personal data (a word whose origin means “given”) each time a person turns on a little 
personal device that is somewhat permanently linked to the Web and to GPS networks, does 
the public not also willingly, albeit unconsciously, surrender some of its freedoms? Is there 
not something contradictory today, consequently, in the very notion of people being 
dispossessed of their personal data? Are people not, in other words, the involuntary 
accomplices of the coercive policies they may condemn?  
As Alice Béja rightly observes, “To speak of ‘data’ is to suppose, on the one hand, that the 
information is true and unconstructed and, on the other hand, that it is given voluntarily, as a 
sort of gift that web users spontaneously make to the government and to the enterprises that 
collect them [29].” And is not this “we”—since it comprises all those who own and more or 
less constantly use a smartphone —enormous? Was not Michel Foucault’s most convincing 
warning in Discipline and Punish that total control by the normalization of populations 
happens when the subjects form themselves into subjects subjected to their own control? Is 
not integrally controlled man self-controlled man?  
Plan Vigipirate is France’s national security alert system, consisting of four threat levels 
represented by five colors: white, yellow, orange, red, and scarlet. Was the first indication of 
this interiorization of the police in the context of French security measures not already 
deducible in Vigipirate, the first phases of which appeared in the early 1990s? As Mathieu 
Rigouste has stressed, the Vigipirate scheme “rests on a principle of shared responsibility for 
our security [15].” In effect, Vigipirate demands the same of citizens as it does of counter-
terrorism services, to conduct generalized surveillance over the entire social environment 
and to act against terrorism. However, it also “promotes a psychological action upon the 
population in order to motivate them to isolate subversives and to practice self-surveillance 
[29].”  
In short, today even more than in 2001, are the people not the absolute accomplices of the 
dilution and disintegration of their own freedom as individuals? Just as personal infatuation 
with smartphones and other technological mediations continues to grow, allowing for the 
capture and diffusion of personal data, so does personal dependence, and personal 
complicity in the atrophy of personal freedom becomes naturalized. People hardly ever think 
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of setting personal devices aside in order to regain a little autonomy and vacation from 
surveillance. Personal fascination with technological “democracy,” personal blind faith, and 
the fetishization of personal prostheses, sanctioning human bodies’ surrender to the 
machine, realizes and actualizes the “docile body” that Michel Foucault conceived in order to 
describe the most deep-seated forms of social control today. It is in such a human-
technological context, fostering widespread acceptance, that the Intelligence Act can 
henceforth institute the possibility of a grand-scale intrusion into personal digital living 
spaces.  
D. Technological Surveillance Activities 
As mentioned earlier, the public learned of some of the activities engaged by the NSA under 
the PATRIOT Act through information made public by Edward Snowden [30]. Revealed 
activities include the following. Secret court orders allow the NSA to regularly gather en 
masse Americans’ phone records and text messages from telephone companies. The NSA can 
regularly request user data from the servers of U.S. tech giants like Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft and Apple, and the companies are compelled by law to comply. The NSA has 
techniques to circumvent widely used web encryption technologies in order to improve the 
utility of the NSA’s surveillance programs.  
The French Intelligence Act portends an era of massive automated surveillance through the 
installation of “black boxes” to access Internet service providers and hosts. Governments, 
current or future, will be able to demand that telephone operators and ISPs implement 
algorithms capable of detecting “terrorist threats” as a function of grouped keywords 
searched or sites consulted. “Specific access” and “privileged profiles” may then be 
established for precisely purposes contrary to the spirit of individual rights and freedoms. 
Article L. 851-3 authorizes “for the exclusive needs of terrorism prevention, the immediate 
collection, on the network of electronic communications operators, the connection data of 
persons previously identified as presenting a threat.” By the same logic and in the same spirit, 
Article L. 851-4 anticipates that “the Prime Minister can order electronic communications 
operators and Internet service providers to detect, by an automatic process, suspicious sets 
of connection data, the anonymity of which will be lifted only when a terrorist threat is 
revealed [30].”  
With these ambitions, as we have only begun to describe above, this new law follows the 
example of the USA PATRIOT Act in envisioning the most complete realization of what 
Rouvroy considers as a “fantasy of control over all potentialities [31],” nourished by the 
American military doctrine of “full spectrum dominance [32].” The societal consequences 
incurred by such a fantasy go far beyond the sole issue of terrorism (as complex as it is!): any 
“threat to order,” from industrial sabotage to a mere protest conceived by law-abiding 
citizens, can become suspect. What becomes clear, above all, in the establishment of such 
measures is a vision of man who is henceforth predictable and who, consequently, can be 
placed under control through entirely technological means. Such an understanding of 
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humanity is eminently contestable and even scandalously naïve, however, if we consider (as 
is always possible) that there may be something formally undetectable in the planning of a 
terrorist act. The novel by Yasmina Kadra, L’Attentat (The Attack), eloquently and poignantly 
reveals this dimension of unpredictability [33]. For that matter, it is by no means insignificant 
that within the intelligence community (notably within the DGSI), certain agents admit a 
preference for human intelligence, “which they judge more effective, although they of course 
do not disdain the information technology brings them [34].”  
The ever-expanding use of digital devices for the purpose of policing may give rise to a 
principle of responsibility regarding scale (or, to invoke Hans Jonas’s expression, to an 
“ethics of the future”)—a principle engaging society not only legally, but morally vis-à-vis 
both present generations and those to come. For what is at stake is the preservation of the 
global social balance within human technological environments—an equilibrium founded on 
the respect of our fundamental values: autonomy, respect for privacy, freedom, and the 
exercise of free will.  
Discussion 
From our political philosophy analysis, some themes are evident. The decisions made by the 
U.S.A. and France so far in the twenty-first century have largely contributed to the spread of 
surveillance into every aspect of existence—choices that could well become irreversible given 
the forms of their materialization. As with problems caused by environmental degradation, 
society risks reaching a point of no return, especially since the systems and devices involved 
in surveillance tend to be intangible and are thus particularly resistant to our critical 
apprehension. In rendering possible the capture of our communicational exchanges in a 
normative and legislative context, society risks no longer being able to participate in the free 
exercise of our social imagination or in individual and collective creativity—in theory and in 
practice—which all democratic society requires in order to continually redefine itself and to 
“make a new beginning,” according to the terms put forth by Hannah Arendt.  This is all the 
more the case when the citizens are compelled to demonstrate in the polis their sense of 
responsibility (in favor of ecology or of sustainable development, for example). Yet what form 
of responsibility is possible without autonomy, without freedom of action and speech, 
without the possibility of formulating a “counter-speech” even if not explicitly forbidden by 
law? What perversions of established orders, what “beginnings” will still be possible in a 
society where everyone knows herself or himself to be perpetually under surveillance? 
Hannah Arendt, in her own time, expressed this fear so very well: “Only if we rob the newborn 
of their spontaneity, their right to begin something new, can the course of the world be 
defined deterministically and predicted.”  It is for people, therefore, to ask themselves what 
world they want to continue to build, and according to what values. 
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